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Recent Rather Unrelated (but irresistible) Developments: 
   
Convicted perjurers are now competent to testify in Maryland courts!   But the fifteen-year 
time limit for impeachment by prior convictions does not apply to convictions for perjury. Rules 
Order, Dec. 13, 2016, effective to actions commencing on or after April 1, 2017 (amending Md. 
Rule 5-609(b) and conforming to HB 237, ch. 531, MD Laws 2016). 
 
General time limit for impeachment of a witness by his or her prior convictions does not 
necessarily preclude questioning of a character witness about the principal witness’s older 
convictions.  Williams v. State (Md. App., Mar. 30, 2017) (no abuse of discretion in permitting 
prosecution to question character witness, who had known defendant for 15 years and testified to 
defendant’s peacefulness, about  whether knowledge of defendant’s 25-year-old conviction for 
battery would affect witness’s testimony). 
 
Restitution for future lost earnings. See In re Cody H. (Md., March 24, 2017). 
 
Witness who took heroin on day of testimony. Cruz v. State (Md. App., Mar. 31, 2017) (no 
abuse of discretion in denying motion to strike testimony of witness who testified she had used 
$40 worth of heroin on day of trial; burden is on moving party to prove incompetence). 
 
Overview of today’s topics: 
  
 Only an out-of-court statement (“OCS”) offered for the truth of the matter that was 
being asserted by the out-of-court declarant (“declarant”) at the time when s/he made the 
OCS (“TOMA”) = hearsay (“HS”). If evidence is not HS, the HS rule cannot exclude it. 
 
 The Confrontation Clause also applies only to HS, but even then, only to its 
subcategory comprising “testimonial hearsay.” 
 
 Cross-references to “MD-EV” are to section numbers of L. MCLAIN, vols. 5, 6, and 
6A of the Maryland Practice Series, MARYLAND EVIDENCE:  STATE AND FEDERAL 
(Thomson Reuters 3d ed. 2013 and 2015-2016 pocket parts, which were compiled by Leonard 
Stamm, Esq.), which is available hardbound or on Westlaw.  The books are most easily found 
on Westlaw by searching for “McLain” under “Secondary Sources” in the Maryland database. 
They contain much more detail than does vol. 7, which is softbound and provides a short 






 An earlier version of the charts in this handout is found in section 800:0 of the treatise.  
That version may be accessed on Westlaw by clicking on the PDF icon for each particular chart. 
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Chart 1 FLOW CHART FOR HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION 
 
 I.  ADMISSIBILITY OR EXCLUSION UNDER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE  
    
 
 
   




    






























IS AN OCS OF A PERSON BEING 
PROVED? 
FOR WHAT PURPOSE IS THE 
PROPONENT OF THE EVI OFFERING 
IT? IS THAT PURPOSE RELEVANT? 
In order for the EVI offered to help (at all) to prove or 
disprove the relevant fact as to which it is offered, must the 
fact-finder rely on the TOMA, the truthfulness/accuracy of a 
fact that was asserted (earlier) by the out-of-court declarant? 
 
Does the EVI fall within an exception to the hearsay rule 
(Md. Rules 5-802.1, 5-803, & 5-804)? Have all of the 
foundation elements for that exception been proved to the 
judge’s satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence 
[Md. Rule 5-104(a)]? See Chart 6, pp. 31-44 below. 
 
Yes (then it might be HS evidence (EVI)). The person 
who made the OCS is the Out-of-Court Declarant. 
Even a witness on the stand is an Out-of-Court 







No (either not an OCS or not by a 
person): not HS (Md. Rule 5-801). 
See Chart 2, pp. 7-13 below. 
No (inadmissible: Md. Rule 5-402). 
No:  Not HS; the HS Rule 
does not exclude the EVI. 
See Chart 3, pp. 13-20 
below. 
 
No (inadmissible HS:  
Md. Rule 5-802). 




















 II.  THE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE EVIDENCE RULES! BUT  
  DOES THE CONSTITUTION EXCLUDE IT? See MD-EV 800:1—800:21. 
 
  A.  Confrontation Clause Overview   
 
  
    

















       
   
 
Should the court exercise its discretion to 
exclude the EVI under Md. Rule 5-403? 
Is the EVI being offered (1) against a 
criminal accused (including an 
alleged juvenile delinquent) AND (2) 
at a trial on the merits? 
Is the EVI “testimonial hearsay”? 
See Chart 4, pp. 20-30 below. 
Is the HS Declarant present and 
subject to cross-exam? 
Yes: inadmissible under another rule (e.g., Md. 
Rules 5-404 through 5-412) or a privilege. If, 
for example, the OCS was made in a 




Yes: Inadmissible because of substantial risk of 
unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. See 
MD-EV 403:1—403:10. 
No:  Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. 
E.g., Blanks v. State, 228 Md. App. 
335 (2016) (D. Eyler, J.) (due process, 
see pp. 6-7 below, but not 
confrontation clause, applies to 
probation revocation hearing). 
 
Yes 
No:  Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. Davis 
v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). 
 
Yes: Confron. Cl. does not exclude it. Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Lawson v 
State, 389 Md. 570 (2005).   
As to the trial court's ability to limit cross-exam, 
see, e.g., Peterson v. State, 444 Md. 105 (2015). 
Yes 
Does any other specific rule of 




































  B.  If the Confrontation Clause Does Not Exclude the Evidence Because It is Not 
Testimonial Hearsay, the Only Remaining Constitutional Safeguard Is the Due 
Process Clause.  See MD-EV 800:20. 
 
Due process requires that a verdict not be based on unreliable hearsay. 
 
Lower appellate courts have therefore continued to apply Ohio v. Roberts, 448 US.56 (1980) to 
evaluate the fact-finder’s reliance on nontestimonial hearsay.  Dictum in Michigan v. Bryant, 562 
U.S. 344 (2011), supports this position.   
 
Under Roberts, there is no error if the nontestimonial hearsay relied upon at trial either: 
 
 (1) Qualifies under a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception (probably all those listed in Title 5, 
except statements against penal interest, Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3)); or 
Did the accused have an earlier 
opportunity to cross-examine the 
Declarant about the OCS? 
EVI is excluded unless accused FORFEITED 
confron. right (see Chart 5, pp. 29-30 below), or 
OCS was a dying declaration (see Chart 4, at p. 
25 below). 
Is the declarant unavailable to testify (Md. 
Rule 5-804(a)? 
No 
No: Confron. Cl. excludes EVI unless 
accused forfeited confron. right.  See Chart 5, 











 (2) Is shown to have had equivalent “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 
 
  Current Maryland case law sometimes adds the requirement that “‘there is good cause for 
[the hearsay’s] admission.’” See Blanks v. State, 228 Md. App. 335 (2016) (D. Eyler, J.) 
(aff’g Brett W. Wilson, J., Dorchester County, who in probation revocation hearing – a 
civil proceeding – had permitted probation agent to testify to collection of probationer’s 
urine sample, and California lab supervisor to testify to presence of marijuana in that 
urine sample; Court of Special Appeals held that probationer’s due process right to 
confront was satisfied).  
 
   The test results in Blanks qualified as business records, and the witnesses’ testimony 
established their reliability.  Because the results met the Roberts reliability test, there was 
no need to also show good cause for their admission.  In any event, however, good cause 
was shown, as it would be “‘highly impractical’” to require the State to call every 
technician who had participated in the assembly-line approach to testing the sample. 
 
Chart 2 IS THE EVIDENCE AN “OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENT” (“OCS”) OF A 
PERSON?  (see MD-EV 801:2—801:6)   
 
 A. What is a “Statement”?   
 
  1.  Md. Rule 5-801(a) defines a “statement” as either “(1) an oral or written assertion 
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an 
assertion.”  
 
   “Statement” means an assertion of one or more facts or opinions. A statement 
may be either an oral assertion, a written assertion (e.g., note or document), or 
conduct intended as an assertion.   
 
  2.  The statement is usually “verbal” (i.e., in words, no matter whether written or 
oral).   
 
  3.  A “statement” also may be nonverbal assertive conduct” clearly intended by 
the actor as a substitute for particular words (e.g., nodding head to say “yes” 
or “no,” pointing to a person in a line-up when asked, “Do you see the person who 
attacked you?,” raising hand to indicate affirmative answer when asked, “who 
would like to volunteer …?”).   
 
  4. “Statement does not include implied assertions from nonverbal nonassertive 
conduct (e.g., walking down the street, putting a heavy coat on, raising an 
umbrella, even if offered to show that the person could walk, that it was cold out, 






  5.  “Statement” may, however, include an implied assertion from an utterance in 
words (but only if the utterance is offered to prove the truth of the implied 
assertion and has no independent relevance as circumstantial, nonhearsay 
evidence. See MD-EV 801:6.  
 
   a.  Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681 (2005) (Raker, J.) (“Is Erik going to get 
me?” was hearsay, because it was relevant only if taken to mean “…like he 
got [killed] Calen?”).  
 
   b.  Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1 (2005) (Raker, J.) (hospital bill found in 
residence where defendant and illegal drugs were found, and addressed to 
defendant at that address, was inadmissible hearsay when the prosecutor 
argued in closing that the hospital would want to be sure it had the right 
address so it could be paid).   
 
    Judge Greene had held, while on the Court of Special Appeals, that the 
evidence was admissible nonhearsay. Judges Wilner and Battaglia, 
dissenting from Judge Raker’s opinion, agreed with Judge Greene.   
 
    The dissent would have followed those cases that hold that a name and 
address on a piece of mail are not intended by the writer “as an assertion,” 
or “not intended to communicate the thought that the [named person] lived 
there,” and thus do not constitute hearsay.  Such evidence, rather, is 
properly admissible “as circumstantial evidence  [making it even slightly 
more likely than it would be without that evidence] that [the defendant] 
stored his property, including his correspondence,” in the place where it was 
found, which in turn tends to prove that the defendant exercises control over 
that place. If offered only for that purpose, Bernadyn should not exclude it.  
 
   c.  Fields v. State, 168 Md. App. 22 (2006) (D. Eyler, J.) (evidence that the 
name “Sat Dogg” was displayed on a screen at a bowling alley was properly 
admitted as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence that 
someone by that name was there), aff’d on other grounds, 395 Md. 758 
(2006) (Raker, J.).   
 
   d.  In a 5 to 2 vote in Garner v. State, 414 Md. 372 (2010) (Murphy, J.) the 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not erred in permitting a police 
officer to testify that he answered the cell phone confiscated from the 
defendant during his arrest, said “hello,” and “a male voice” said, “Yo, can I 
get a 40.”  The evidence was nonhearsay.   
 
    Judge Murphy, writing for the majority, reasoned that (1) “[w]hen a 
telephone is used to receive illegal wagers or to receive orders called in by 
persons who wish to purchase a controlled dangerous substance, the 





against hearsay does not operate to exclude evidence of the ‘verbal act’ that 
established a consequential fact: Petitioner was in possession of a telephone 
called by a person who requested to purchase cocaine.”   
 
    The result of admissibility reached by this decision conformed to the results 
obtained for decades in the Court of Special Appeals and around the country 
as to similar evidence of telephone calls placing bets or requesting drugs. 
The “verbal act” rationale would differentiate the bookie-betting parlor and 
drug order cases like Garner from cases like Stoddard and Bernadyn.  But 
Garner may indicate a partial retreat from the Stoddard majority’s 
approach. 
 
    The Garner majority could have affirmed under the facts there by looking at 
the evidence as nonassertive, circumstantial, nonhearsay evidence that a 
phone connected with the defendant received such a call, which was 
relevant even if the caller did not have any apparent intention to 
communicate to the person who answered the phone the fact that the 
defendant sold cocaine.  This would be consistent with Judge Wilner’s 
concurrence joined by Judges Greene and Battaglia in Stoddard, p. 8 above.   
 
    If the Garner majority opinion is read as following this approach, then the 
evidence in Fields also was not hearsay; nor would the evidence in 
Bernadyn have been hearsay if offered for the proper, relevant, limited 
purpose that something with the defendant’s name on it was found at the 
address where the drugs were found.   
 
    Interestingly, the Garner majority stated:  “We need not either reaffirm or 
overrule either of those fact-specific cases in [Stoddard or Bernadyn] in 
order to hold that the rule against hearsay was not violated by Trooper 
Gussoni’s testimony about the telephone call at issue [in Garner].”  Judges 
Battaglia and Greene were in the majority in Garner, and were joined by 
three judges who joined the court after Stoddard, Bernadyn, and Fields: 
Judges Adkins, Barbera, and Murphy.  Chief Judge Bell and Judge Harrell, 
the only two remaining on the Court of Appeals who were in the majority in 
Stoddard, found themselves alone in the dissent in Garner.   
 
   e.  Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (numbers 
shown on cell phone as to missed and received calls were not statements of 
a person; even if they had been, their relevance did not depend upon the 
belief or accuracy of the person(s) who made the calls, and the testimony of 
police detective to the numbers he saw was not hearsay).   
 
   f.  In Fair v. State, 198 Md. App. 1 (2011) (Kenney, J.), a paycheck with the 
defendant’s name on it, with a pay date of the day before a police officer 





underneath a bag of marijuana, was held to have been properly admitted by 
the trial court “to show the Defendant’s possessory interest in the 
vehicle’….”   
 
    Relying on Garner, as well as several federal cases (including a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision) holding that paychecks and money orders were not 
factual assertions, the Court of Special Appeals held that the paycheck was 
a nonhearsay verbal act, relevant and offered as “merely circumstantial 
nonassertive crime scene evidence.” 
 
    The latter part of the rationale is more intellectually appealing here, because 
the fact that the paycheck bore the defendant’s name and was found in the 
vehicle linked someone with that name to the vehicle, and it was offered for 
that limited purpose, rather than to show that the payor owed or had paid a 
certain sum. If it had been offered as to the latter purpose, and that fact had 
been relevant, it would have been relevant as a nonhearsay “verbal act.”   
 
 B.   When is a Statement an “Out-of-Court” Statement? See MD-EV 801:2.   
 
  1.  Md. Rule 5-801(c) defines an out-of-court statement (“OCS”) as “a statement, 
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing ….”   
 
  2.  “Out-of-court” thus means that the evidence offered today at trial is of a 
statement made by any person somewhere else at another time.  The other 
place may even have been another court proceeding.   
 
  3.  It is still “out-of-court” EVEN IF THE DECLARANT IS AT TRIAL 
TESTIFYING TO HIS OR HER OWN EARLIER STATEMENT. Some 
hearsay exceptions even require that the declarant also testify at trial, see Md. 
Rule 5-802.1: certain of the declarant-witness’s prior inconsistent or consistent 
statements, the declarant-witness’s prior identification of a person, the declarant-
witness’s prompt report of sexual assault, and the declarant-witness’s recorded 
recollection. These hearsay exception rules would be unnecessary if the fact that 
the declarant is testifying at trial made his or her out-of-court statements 
nonhearsay.  
 
  4.  Why the strong preference for live testimony rather than out-of-court statements, 
even of a declarant who is now on the stand?   
 
   a.  Better evaluation of demeanor evidence as the witness is testifying to the 
underlying facts, rather than reciting a statement;  
   b.  Better ability to cross-examine live memory;   
   c.  Out-of-court statement may not have been under oath;   
   d.  Much time is saved and undue emphasis avoided, if live memory serves, so 





   e.   Removal of an incentive for the unethical manufacture of perfectly scripted 
out-of-court statements.  
 
 C.  To Be Covered by the Hearsay Rule, a Statement Must Have Been Made by “a 
Person” (see MD-EV 801:3)   
 
  1. Md. Rule 5-801 defines a “statement” as having been by “a person.”  It does not 
include “statements” by animals – such as a talking parrot, a crowing rooster, or 
a barking dog – or “statements” by machines, because neither can be cross-
examined.  
 
   Rules other than the hearsay rule require a showing of relevance and reliability, 
such as foundation evidence regarding the training of the dog, or the routine 
maintenance of the machines – or the soundness of the principles they apply.  Cf. 
In re A.N., 226 Md. App. 283 (2015) (reliance on mother’s polygraph results was 
reversible error).   
 
  2. Numbers Shown on Cell Phone for Incoming Calls was Nonhearsay.   
 
   Carpenter v. State, 196 Md. App. 212, 224-25 (2010) (Thieme, J.) (numbers 
shown on cell phone designating missed and received calls were not assertions or 
statements of a person; additionally, their relevance did not depend upon the 
belief or accuracy of the person(s) who made the calls, and the testimony of the 
police detective to the numbers he saw was not hearsay).   
 
  3. Whether the Statement is By a Person is a Critical Issue in the Confrontation 
Clause Context 
 
   See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (Niemeyer, 
J.) (20 pages of data generated by Armed Forces Institute’s Forensic Toxicology 
Laboratory chromatograph machine and computers, showing that the 
defendant’s blood sample contained ethanol and phencyclidine, were 
nonhearsay, because the machine performing chromatography on the 
defendant’s blood was not a “person” and could not be a “declarant” under Fed. 
R. Evid. 801), cert. denied (U.S. 2009); United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 
361-62 (7th Cir. 2008) (instruments’ readings were not statements, though 
expert’s conclusions based on them were), cert. denied (U.S. 2008); United 
States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 193, 202 (4th Cir. 2011) (Washington still good law 
after Bullcoming, see p. 21 below).   
 
   The facts of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, p. 21 below, did not directly raise 
this question, because there the evidence was not a machine printout but a 
certificate by a person, based on the machine readings. The same was true in Derr 






   Note the critical difference between a machine printout of instruments’ 
readings, as opposed to a machine printout of data input by a person.  For the 
latter to be admissible for its truth, a hearsay exception, such as for business 
records, will be needed if the statement is offered for its truth. 
 
   In her thoughtful opinion in Baker v. State, 223 Md. App. 750 (2015), Judge 
Graeff stated for the Court: 
 
[T]he better reasoned view is that computer-generated records [such as 
cell phone call records] generally do not constitute hearsay.  When records 
are entirely self-generated by the internal operations of the computer, they 
do not implicate the hearsay rule because they do not constitute a 
statement of a “person.”  In that situation, the admissibility of such 
“‘should be determined on the basis of the reliability and accuracy of the 
process’ used to create and obtain the data.’”  
* * *  
Courts have made a distinction between computer-generated records, 
where the data is generated by the internal operations of the computer 
itself, and computer-stored [such as text messages] records, which reflect 
human input. (Emphasis added.) 
 
     The Baker court accordingly held that, because it was “likely that the assertion in 
the computer records that the phone number that called the victim was appellant's 
number was an assertion made by a person,” it could not affirm their admission 
on the ground that they were nonhearsay.  Because the State failed to have the 
records certified as business records, or have the foundation for their qualification 
as business records proved by testimony of their custodian, their admission was 
error. (On the somewhat related issue of the need for an expert to testify to the 
significance of a cell phone call’s being relayed from a particular tower, see State 
v. Payne, 440 Md. 680 (2014).)   
 
   In a case very similar to Washington, United States v. Drayton, 2014 WL 
2919792 (D. Md. 2014) (Grimm, J.), aff’d, 589 Fed. Appx. 153 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 101 (U.S. 2015), the blood of a defendant 
driving erratically on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway was tested by the D.C. 
Office  of the Chief Medical Examiner. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's 
admission, in a bench trial, of the lab’s Deputy Chief Toxicologist’s testimony 
(without the testimony of the technicians who ran the tests) to his conclusion, 
based on “‘the raw data that was generated’” by the chromatograph, as to the 
concentrations of alcohol and PCP in the defendant’s blood. Under Washington, 
that machine-generated raw data was not hearsay. 
 
    As Judge Grimm pointed out in Drayton, “Given the fractured nature of Williams 
[v. Illinois, see p. 23 below], its limited precedential value, and most critically, the 





(p. 11 above) and Summers (pp. 11 above and 23 below), the Supreme Court 
cannot be said to have overruled those cases.”  Drayton at fn. 6.  Nor was the 
packet containing that data ever admitted into evidence, so that Fed. R. Evid. 703 
(corollary to Md. Rule 5-703) applied. 
 
   The prosecution had failed to provide a witness who could authenticate that the 
tested blood was the defendant’s, but the defense had failed to preserve that 
ground for objection. 
 
   Compare with this well-reasoned Fourth Circuit line of cases the less 
intellectually satisfying, strained rationale of United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 
1069, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 2013) (affirming admission of computer printouts of data 
generated by GPS tracking device hidden in packet of bank currency as 
nontestimonial business records generated for “the purpose of locating a robber 
and recovering stolen money” rather than “‘for the purpose of establishing or 
proving some fact at trial’”). 
 
           The recent Maryland case, Gross v. State, 229 Md. App. 24 (2016) (Woodward, 
J.), addressed the lack of need for an expert to testify as to GPS data in records 
generated from the GPS on a stolen box truck, but did not address the hearsay or 
confrontation issue. The best analysis would be that they were machine-generated 
nonhearsay; but if found to be hearsay, they would have been nontestimonial 
business records, as they were routinely generated by the truck's movements, not 
for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal 
conduct. 
 
Chart 3 IS THE OCS OFFERED FOR “TOMA”? 
 
 A. Hearsay Schemata 
 
 (1)  What is the evidence offered? Does it include an OCS of a person? (The 
evidence may be more than the OCS itself, e.g., it may include to whom and under 
what circumstances an OCS was made.)  (2) If so, how is the evidence relevant to 
the proponent's case: what is it offered to help to prove?  (3) Finally, how does the 
evidence help to prove that fact?  Does the OCS only have probative value as to 





  1. If the evidence offered includes an “OCS” of a person, it is hearsay only if it 
is offered at trial to prove “TOMA.” 
 
 
 (1)  EVI offered (determined to  
  include an OCS OF A PERSON) 
(2) MATERIAL FACT 
that EVI #(1) is offered 
to help to prove 
 






  2. TOMA = the truth of any fact that was being asserted by the declarant, AT 
THE EARLIER TIME when the declarant made the out-of-court statement. 
 
When the OCS is offered for TOMA, all four hearsay dangers are potentially present: 
perception (did the declarant know what he was talking about?); memory (had the 
declarant forgotten before making the OCS?); sincerity (did the declarant have reason 
to lie? or was her statement intended in jest?); and narration/ambiguity (did the 
declarant mean what the words reported to have been uttered seem to mean?) 
 
 B. TOMA Analysis (see MD-EV 801:7)   
 
  The OCS is offered for TOMA if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on, as 
true, accurate, or correct, something the declarant asserted in his/her OCS. 
 
  The step-by-step analysis:   
 
  1. Who was the out-of-court declarant? 
 
  2. What was the declarant asserting at the time s/he made the OCS? 
 
  3. For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the proponent 
offering the evidence at trial? 
 
  4. HOW DOES THE EVIDENCE TEND TO PROVE THAT FACT? 
 
   Md. Rule 5-401 relevance requires only the slightest probative value, not even 
necessarily persuasive probative value.  See MD-EV 401:1.   
 
  5. If the evidence offered simply HELPS (even a little) TO PROVE the fact as to 
which it is offered, even if the out-of-court declarant was either insincere or 
inaccurate, the evidence is NOT HEARSAY.   
 
   Ask, “Even if the assertions made in the OCS were incorrect, is it still relevant 
that the declarant made the statement?”  If the answer to this question is yes, 
then the evidence is nonhearsay. 
 
   The evidence may come in for the relevant nonhearsay purpose (subject to 
exclusion under Md. Rule 5-403).  A limiting instruction should be given 
upon request (Md. Rule 5-105).  As to Md. Rule 5-403: 
 
   See Graves v. State, 334 Md. 30 (1994) (reversible error to admit arrestee’s 
hearsay statement to police that defendant was his accomplice, for nonhearsay 
purpose of showing why police included defendant’s picture in photographic 
array to be shown to victim:  limited probative value for that purpose was 






   Sanders v. State, 194 Md. App. 162, 179-87 (2010) (no abuse of discretion in 
excluding fact that defendant made a post-Miranda statement to police when 
offered by defense for nonhearsay purpose, as it “likely would have confused the 
jury and caused it to speculate why the statement was not introduced into 
evidence”), vacated on other grounds, 418 Md. 368 (2011).   
 
 C. Frequently Recurring Categories of Nonhearsay When an OCS is Relevant Short of 
Helping to Prove TOMA 
 
  1. Sometimes THE MERE FACT THAT THE OCS WAS MADE HAS 
RELEVANCE, regardless of whether the declarant was either sincere or 
accurate. In this event, the question is simply whether the OCS was made as 
testified to; because a person testifying to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as 
to whether the OCS was made as s/he has testified, there is no need for the 
hearsay rule to apply.  The witness on the stand can be cross-examined as to 
faulty perception or memory or impeached as to credibility for truthfulness.   
 
   a. VERBAL ACTS (a/k/a “legally operative facts”): the substantive law 
regarding the particular type of claim or defense either requires that an 
out-of-court statement have been made, e.g., defamation, contracts 
(including the offer and the acceptance), wills; or gives a particular legal 
effect to that type of statement (e.g., “Your money or your life!”).  See 
MD-EV 801:8-801:9.   
 
    These utterances are “magic words” under the substantive law; they 
automatically take the speaker to a particular legal destination, without the 
need to inquire into the declarant's sincerity or accuracy. See Garner v. 
State (caller’s utterance, “Yo, can I get a 40?”) and Fair v. State (paycheck), 
pp. 8-10 above.   
 
    See Foster v. University of Maryland Eastern Shore, 908 F. Supp. 2d 686, 
691-92 (D. Md. 2012) (Grimm, J.) (statement that constituted part of alleged 
harassment), on reconsideration, 2013 WL 5487813 (D. Md. 2013) 
(granting defense motion for summary judgment on Title VII claim), rev’d 
on other grounds, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015);   
 
    Windsor v. State, 2016 WL 4076198 (Md. App. 2016) (unreported) 
(Thieme, J.) (initialed note, “acquired eight tools, amount owed $120,”  
found in partially filled Oxycodone bottle in defendant's car, was a verbal 
act, a promissory note, and admissible nonhearsay, helping to prove that 
defendant’s possession of the drug was commercial; alternate holding, 






    Johnson v. State, 228 Md. 27 (2016) (Woodward, J.) (in prosecution for 
harassment by electronic mail, the harassing emails, sufficiently 
authenticated by circumstantial evidence linking them to defendant).   
 
   b.  STATEMENTS OFFERED TO PROVE THEIR EFFECT ON THE 
HEARER OR READER, to prove that the hearer or reader was put on 
notice, or affecting the reasonableness of the hearer’s or reader’s subsequent 
conduct, e.g., “Be careful, the floor is wet,” or, in a negligent hiring or 
retention case, what the employer had been told about the employee. See 
MD-EV 801:10.   
 
    E.g., Foster v. University of Maryland Eastern Shore, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 
691-92 (D. Md. 2012), p. 15 above (co-worker’s offensive statements to 
plaintiff, her responses telling him she wanted no part of his behavior, and 
her complaints to human resources and public safety officers were all 
admissible nonhearsay, to show their effect on the listeners);  
 
    Jarrett v. State, 220 Md. App. 571, 579-83 (2014) (Berger, J.) (in 
defendant’s prosecution for murder of his wife, son’s comments to father in 
recorded telephone call were properly admitted to show their putting him on 
notice of son’s intent to cremate his mother’s remains, which was relevant 
when defense argued that it had not had opportunity to examine remains); 
 
    Harris v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 227 Md. App. 617, 644 n. 15 
(2016) (housing authority’s employees’ statements to affiant that they could 
not recall was relevant, not to show that they did not recall, but merely for 
nonhearsay purpose to show affiant’s difficulty in finding information);   
 
    Wagner v. State, 213 Md. App. 419, 471 (2013) (Graeff, J.) (witness’s 
statement that he could not read or write, made to police detective, was 
properly admitted to show why detective had not required witness to write 
on back of photo witness had identified, when detective had required 
another witness to do so). 
 
    Rehabilitation of an Impeached Witness by Evidence of Threats He Had 
Received:  
 
     Armstead v. State, 195 Md. App. 599 (2010) (Kenney, J.) (no error in 
admitting State’s witness’s testimony that he was scared and that his 
life had been threatened, when witness was nervous and made 
inconsistent statements, and court had given limiting instructions that 
evidence was relevant only to witness’s credibility and that there was 
no evidence that defendant was involved in or knew of the threats), 






    EXCLUSION UNDER MD. RULE 5-403:  Statements offered to prove why 
the police took certain actions are relevant for the effect on the hearer, 
but are often excluded under Md.  Rule 5-403 when offered for this 
limited purpose, due to the risk that the jury will consider them for 
their truth. See Graves v. State, p. 14 above. 
 
     Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.) reaffirms this general 
principle, but found no error under the facts there when the detective 
did not repeat the OCS, but testified that, based on the victim’s, 
another officer’s, and codefendant’s statements, he retrieved certain 
items as associated with the alleged robbery.   
 
   c.  STATEMENTS THAT ARE OFFERED AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE ONLY SUCH MATTERS AS THE 
DECLARANT’S BEING ALIVE, CONSCIOUS (which may be relevant, 
e.g., to pain and suffering), ABLE TO SPEAK A PARTICULAR 
LANGUAGE, ETC., AT THE TIME S/HE MADE THE OCS. See MD-
EV 801:12.  Here it doesn’t matter what the declarant said, only that she 
said something. 
 
   d.   PRIOR STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DECLARANT, THAT ARE 
OFFERED ONLY TO IMPEACH OR REHABILITATE THE 
DECLARANT’S CREDIBILITY, but not as substantive evidence.  See 
MD-EV 801:13.   
 
    i.  Prior inconsistent statements made by the person who is sought to 
be impeached (Md. Rules 5-613, witnesses, and 5-806, nontestifying 
hearsay declarants).   
 
     See Handy v. State, 201 Md. App. 521 (2011) (Sharer, J.) (defendant’s 
OCS, recounting a witness’s OCS, was properly admitted:  defendant’s 
as a statement of a party opponent, and the witness’s OCS within it 
was admitted only to impeach witness with witness’s own statement).   
 
     A party can impeach a witness or declarant with that witness’s or 
declarant’s own prior inconsistent statements.  But a party cannot 
impeach one witness with someone else’s out-of-court statement; to do 
that would be to offer the non-witness’s statement for its truth, which 
is a hearsay purpose.   
 
     Sweetney v. State, 423 Md. 610 (2011) (Murphy, J.) (trial court 
properly precluded cross-examination of police officer-witness with 
out-of-court statement made by another officer in the same 
department, regarding search warrant “return” which did not list item 






     As to Md. Rule 5-806, cf. Taylor v. State, 407 Md. 137 (2009) 
(impeachment of a key, non-testifying declarant – whose OCS has 
been admitted for its TOMA – by extrinsic evidence of a prior bad act 
under Md. Rule 5-608(b) must be allowed, if it would have been 
permitted if the declarant had testified at trial).  
 
    ii.  Under certain circumstances the credibility of a witness or out-of-
court declarant may be rehabilitated by proof that that person’s 
prior statements were consistent with his trial testimony. Md. Rule 
5-616(c)(2).  OCS is to be offered for a limited purpose under Md. 
Rule 5-105 and is subject to possible exclusion under Md. Rule 5-403. 
 
     See Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412 (1998) (Chasanow, J.) (use for this 
purpose may be permitted when substantive use under Md. Rule 5-
802.1(c), see p. 32 below, is not).   
 
  2. STATEMENTS THAT DEPEND, FOR THEIR RELEVANCE, ON THE 
DECLARANT’S HAVING BEEN SINCERE, BUT NOT ON HIS/HER 
HAVING BEEN FACTUALLY ACCURATE, ARE ALSO NOT OFFERED 
FOR TOMA.  Here the OCS is offered for a nonhearsay purpose, as 
circumstantial evidence to prove the declarant’s emotion, state of mind, 
knowledge, belief, intent, sanity, affection, ill will, etc., when it is a relevant 
issue in the case.  The OCS is not a direct assertion by the declarant of his state 
of mind.  See MD-EV 801:11.   
 
   See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 575-80 (2007) (Raker, J.) (evidence of 
defendant’s initial refusal to provide a blood sample was properly admitted as 
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, as State had laid proper 
foundation by showing that defendant was told blood was needed in reference to 
the victim’s health);  Holland v. State, 122 Md. App. 532 (1998) (Moylan, J.).   
 
   Examples:   
 
   (1)  In A’s trial for murder of B, the State offers, as relevant to A’s motive or 
intent, C’s testimony that A said to C a week before the murder, “B is a mean, 
nasty, rotten so-and-so.”   
 
   How is this evidence relevant to the State’s case? Is it relevant only if A was 
correct as to the facts A asserted, i.e., that B was really mean, nasty, etc.?   
 
   No.  It will be probative of A’s motive or intent simply if the declarant A believed 
that the fact he asserted was true: here, that B was nasty, etc., even if A was  
inaccurate, and mistaken about B.  The evidence may be properly admitted for a 





ill of B, which is relevant to A’s motive and intent. The evidence would help to 
prove the fact it is offered at trial to prove, even if A was factually wrong, and 
B was really a kind and lovely person.  
 
   Now assume instead that the State calls C to testify to A’s OCS one week before 
the murder, “I hate B.”  This OCS is a direct assertion by A of A’s state of mind, 
and is offered to prove that A was accurate, i.e., did have the state of mind, i.e., 
A hated B.  This OCS is offered to prove TOMA and is hearsay, so it must fall 
within a hearsay exception in order for the hearsay rule not to exclude it. (Here it 
will qualify under the state of mind hearsay exception, Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3).) 
 
   (2)  In a CINA case, suppose that the social worker wishes to testify that the 
child's father told her, “[Eight-year-old child] is a crybaby. I knew [my 
girlfriend’s 12-year-old daughter] was beating on him. But I didn't feel like being 
bothered with him. I went out to have a smoke.” Would all or part of this be 
relevant only for TOMA? If for TOMA, which hearsay exception(s) would 
apply? 
 
 D. Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject to the Confrontation 
Clause: An Important Threshold Question Not to Be Overlooked (see MD-EV 
800:7 and 801:7—801:14)   
 
   Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The Clause…does not bar the 
use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted.”); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (defendant’s rights under the 
confrontation clause were not violated by the introduction of the confession of an 
accomplice for the nonhearsay purpose of rebutting respondent’s testimony that his 
own confession was coercively derived from the accomplice’s statement).  See 
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227-78 (U.S. 2012) (four justices of a plurality of 
five held that Cellmark DNA report that was part of basis of testifying expert’s opinion, 
under equivalent of Md. Rule 5-703, was admitted as nonhearsay, under Illinois law). 
 
  Hypo: Juvenile is charged with assault and burglary for allegedly breaking into home 
where teenaged mother [A.R.] of his child lived with her parents and punching A.R. in 
the face. Juvenile’s defense is that the door was open and that A.R. fabricated her 
testimony because he wanted to get custody of their child. 
 
  Defense counsel proffers that Juvenile wishes to testify that, when he entered the home, 
he told A.R.: “I’m tired of all your mess. I’ve hired a lawyer. We’re going to take you 
to court and say you are unfit. I have all your text messages, and I am going to get the 
baby.”  At this point, A.R. said, “I’m going to get your ass in jail. You will never get 
[the baby.]” 
 
   Is any of this evidence nonhearsay?  Hearsay? If hearsay, does it fall under any hearsay 






   See Redfearn v. State, 212 Md. App. 785 (2013) (unreported) Sept. Term, 2012, 
no. 1379), cert. denied, 434 Md. 314 (2013). 
 
Chart 4  THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE:  IS THE HEARSAY “TESTIMONIAL?”   
See MD-EV 800:10—800:19.   
 
  Text of U.S. Constitution, amend. VI:  An accused has the right to confront “the 
witness” against him or her. In pari materia, Md. Decl. of Rights art. 21.   
 
I. HEARSAY IS TESTIMONIAL (AND THUS SUBJECT TO THE RIGHT TO 
CONFRONT) IF IT IS: 
 
 A.  U.S. Supreme Court Cases: Testimonial Hearsay 
 
  (1) Ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing; or   
  (2) A plea allocution; or   
  (3)  Grand jury testimony; or   
  (4)  Prior trial testimony; or   
  (5)  “Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations…” 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).   
 
   In Crawford, the testimonial statements were made during a “structured, 
recorded” interrogation at the police station, when the declarant and her 
husband were suspected of having committed an assault.   
 
   Crawford focused on the historical context of the Sixth Amendment: antipathy 
toward Queen “Bloody Mary’s” government’s gathering of formal, solemn, ex 
parte statements to be used in criminal prosecutions.   
 
   (6) Police “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, 
in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict), the perpetrator. The 
product of such interrogations, whether reduced to a writing signed by the 
declarant or embedded in the memory (and perhaps notes) of the 
interrogating officer, is testimonial.” Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 
(2006).   
 
   Both an affidavit signed by a domestic violence (DV) victim and her oral 
statements to police at the marital home, where her husband, Mr. Hammon, was in 
another room, with another officer, were testimonial. Davis’s companion case, 
Hammon v. Indiana, 554 U.S. 353 (2006). (J. Thomas dissented as to Hammon 
facts.)   
 
   The Davis/Hammon Court looked at (1) the “primary motive” (viewed 





questions: was it to resolve an ongoing emergency (yielding nontestimonial 
statements) or to help to prove past criminal conduct/agency “some time 
after the events described were over” (yielding testimonial statements)? and 
(2) the relative degree of solemnity and formality of the interrogation.  Both of 
these factors were held to be relevant to what an objective declarant would take to 
be the primary purpose of his or her statements.   
 
   Dictum:  “volunteered testimony” in absence of interrogation would still be 
testimonial.   
 
  (7)  Notarized certificates by analysts of “a state laboratory required by law to 
conduct chemical analysis upon police request” that a seized substance was 
cocaine and how much it weighed.   
 
   Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (5 to 4 decision: dissent by 
Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Breyer and Alito, JJ.).   
 
   But dictum: “notice and demand” statutes are constitutional. Note:  The State 
must provide notice, e.g., under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 10-1001 
through 10-1003, of a state chemist’s report regarding a controlled substance 
before each trial, including retrials, even where the defense had cross-examined 
the expert at the first trial. Harrod v. State, 423 Md. 24 (2011).   
 
  (8)  In a case like #7, the witness subject to cross must be either the person who 
performed or who witnessed the tests. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 
(2011) (Here, the lab analyst who performed the tests, and certified and signed the 
blood alcohol concentration results, had been put on unpaid leave.) (same 4 
dissenters as in Melendez-Diaz, #7 above) (Sotomayor, J., concurred in part, 
stressing that the testifying expert “had no involvement whatsoever in the relevant 
test and report,” and leaving for another day a case in which the witness “is a 
supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited connection to 
the scientific test at issue....”).  See Malaska v. State, 213 Md. App. 492 (2014), p. 
22 below.  Be sure to see Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221(U.S. 2012), Norton, 
and the Derr saga, pp. 23-24 below, for limitations on Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming.   
 
 B.  Maryland Cases: Testimonial Hearsay 
 
  Statements To or By Agents of Police 
 
  (9)  Co-defendant’s statements made during proffer sessions for plea     
bargaining.  Butler v. State, 231 Md. App. 533 (2017) (reversible error in 
denying defendant's motion for mistrial after detective used knowledge from 
nontestifying co-defendant’s proffer statements to testify to meaning of recorded 





limiting instruction to use only as to co-defendant who made statements did not 
cure error). 
 
  (10) Statements of 8 and 10-year-old children in an interview by a social worker 
working in tandem with and in presence of police officers, when child abuse 
had been reported and the children had already accused defendant to the 
police. Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 641 (2005) (Harrell, J.) (adopting test of 
“whether the statements were made under circumstances that would lead an 
objective declarant reasonably to believe that the statements would be 
available for use later at trial”). 
 
  (11) Nontestifying codefendant’s written and taped statements to police at the 
police station. 
 
   Codefendant had made a “miscellaneous agreement” functionally equivalent to a 
guilty plea agreement that would become effective after defendant’s jury trial 
(unless the codefendant made a successful motion for acquittal). Because the 
codefendant had waived his right to actively participate in the trial, the trial court 
should have treated his confession under Crawford, rather than simply under 
Bruton. Morris v. State, 418 Md. 194 (2011) (Harrell, J.).   
 
  (12)  Domestic violence assault victim’s excited statements to responding police, 
where defendant was known to be sitting on steps outside victim’s apartment 
and there were no apparent severe injuries requiring immediate medical 
attention.  State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307 (2009) (Adkins, J.).   
 
  (13) Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245 n.5 (2012) (D. Eyler, J.) (State conceded that 
statements declarant made to police in months following stabbings were 
testimonial).   
 
  Autopsy Reports    
 
  (14) See Malaska v. State, 216 Md. App. 492 (2014) (autopsy report was sufficiently 
formalized to be testimonial, in part perforce, due to the medical examiner's 
statutory obligations, but defendant’s right to confront was satisfied by 
testimony of and ability to cross examine supervisor who was present during 
the autopsy, reviewed the slides, and made the conclusion as to cause and 
manner of death), cert. denied, 439 Md. 696 (2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
1162 (U.S. 2015). But as to lab reports attached to the autopsy report, see Reaves, 
p. 24 below. 
 
   The first post-Crawford v. Washington analysis of this issue in Maryland 
concluded that certain parts of autopsy reports, “Opinions, speculation and other 
conclusions drawn [in autopsy reports] from the objective findings in autopsy 





(Greene, J.). Accord Costley v. State, 175 Md. App. 90 (2007).  But Rollins’s 
rationale no longer holds. See p. 29 below. 
 
  Lab Results 
 
  (15)  DNA and the Derr saga:  Although no longer good law, Derr v. State, 422 Md. 
211 (2011) (Greene, J.) (Derr I) held, relying on Bullcoming, p. 21 above, that the 
Confrontation Clause demands that either the analyst who performed the test 
leading to DNA results or a supervisor who observed it must testify at trial.  
   Derr I held inadmissible a testifying expert’s testimony relying in part on the 
results of another’s 2002 DNA analysis, when she had supervised only the 
subsequent “matching” 2004 DNA analysis. Derr I applied the same reasoning to 
the results obtained by a serology examiner in 1985 regarding blood and semen at 
the time of the charged rape.   
 
   Judge Harrell, joined by Judge Battaglia, concurred as to the testimony based on 
the 2002 DNA analysis, but dissented as to the expert’s testimony relying on the 
1985 serological results, which they found to be merely “raw data” and different 
in several significant ways from the certificates in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, p. 21 above. 
 
   The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held the opposite way to the 
Derr  I majority in United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011).  
 
   Derr I was vacated and remanded for reconsideration, 133 S. Ct. 63 (U.S. 2012), 
in light of Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (U.S. 2012), where the plurality 
had found no confrontation violation when DNA analysis by Cellmark of a 
vaginal swab from the victim was relied on under the equivalent of Md. Rule 
5-703 and compared by the testifying expert to her own analysis of the 
defendant's blood sample. The reasoning was fractured: (1) four justices held that 
the Cellmark analysis was not admitted for its truth, but for a nonhearsay purpose;  
(2) four held, alternately, that the Cellmark report was nontestimonial, because its 
authors lacked “the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of criminal 
conduct,” 132 S. Ct. at 2242; and (3) five justices found that, in any event, the 
Cellmark report was insufficiently solemn and formalized (unlike an affidavit, 
deposition, or a formalized dialogue such as custodial interrogation) to be 
testimonial, so that it was nontestimonial.  See MD-EV 703:1 and 800:15. 
 
           On remand in Derr II, 434 Md. 88 (2013) (Greene, J.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
2723 (U.S. 2014),  the Court of Appeals, relying on the agreement of the five 
Supreme Court justices in Williams, held that the DNA report was insufficiently 







   Four days after its decision in Derr II, the Court of Appeals similarly held in 
Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 209 (2013) (Greene, J.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2723 
(U.S. 2014) (also holding that the trial court did not err either in concluding that 
sufficient evidence of the chain of custody of the bodily fluid from the alleged 
attacker had been shown, or in admitting the resulting DNA report as having been 
shown to be trustworthy, reasonably relied upon by the testifying supervisor in 
forming her opinion that the tested sample showed the DNA profile of – at that 
point – an unidentified male, and necessary to illuminate her testimony; another 
witness testified to having compared those results with the profile made from a 
sample taken from the defendant by a buccal swab). 
 
   But the Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently held that a Forensic DNA 
Case Report, comparing the DNA from a buccal swab of the defendant and the 
laboratory’s analysis of DNA on a ski mask, and concluding “within a 
reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that the defendant was a major 
source of the saliva tested,  was testimonial.  State v. Norton, 443 Md. 517 
(2015) (Battaglia, J.).  Admitting the report without testimony of the analyst who 
authored and signed it was reversible error.  Testimony of the supervisor who had 
“reviewed all the materials, all of the notes, the lab notes, all of the data that was 
generated, the paperwork and the final report” did not satisfy the defendant's 
confrontation right. 
 
   The Court of Appeals shifted its analysis from that which it had followed in 
Derr II.  The approach adopted in Norton is instead whether the report was 
“created to accuse ‘a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct’.”  
   Applying this rule, from Justice Alito’s plurality opinion in Williams, the Norton 
court concluded, would still lead to the result that the Derr reports were 
nontestimonial, while the Norton report was testimonial.  The Norton report 
would also have been testimonial under Bullcoming, p. 21 above, so that the 
defendant has the right to “cross-examine the responsible analyst.”  
 
   Bullcoming will apply when a report “includes the signatures of laboratory 
officials, identifies the accused as the culprit in the underlying investigation, 
conveys conclusory statements and certifies that proper procedures were followed 
in reaching the ultimate conclusion.”  Norton, 443 Md. at 553.  Norton, at fn. 32, 
distinguished from the case before it a Washington state case in which the 
supervisor had testified, but the underlying draft report was not admitted into 
evidence.  That situation would seem to be more akin to Williams and Cooper. 
 
   The result in Cooper seems to remain correct, post-Norton. 
 
   Compare Reaves v. State, 2015 WL 6470501 (Md. App. 2015) (Zarnoch, J.) 
(unreported) (in grandmother’s prosecution for child abuse resulting in death 
caused by rubbing methadone on toddlers’ gums to help them sleep, toxicology 





reaching her conclusion that cause of death was methadone intoxication;  
toxicology report, although signed by two reviewers, contained no certification, 
such as a representation as to the accuracy of the results, and was not sufficiently 
formal or solemnized to be testimonial;  if, however, the report were testimonial, 
its author’s testimony satisfied defendant’s confrontation right; although she did 
not conduct the tests, she reviewed the results and signed the report). 
 
  Statements to and by Medical Personnel 
 
  (16)  Report prepared by SAFE nurse employed by the Sexual Assault Center at 
Prince George’s Hospital, where victim had been taken by police officer (who 
requested certain tests) after victim had been examined and bandaged at another 
hospital; the 2nd hospital performed forensic tests and prescribed antibiotics; 
report showed location of physical injuries observed by SAFE nurse.  Green v. 
State, 199 Md. App. 386 (2011).   
 
  Interpreters 
 
  (17) Taylor v. State, 226 Md. App. 317 (2016) (Arthur, J.)  (reversible error to admit 
interpreter's statements as to what deaf defendant was saying during police 














II. HEARSAY IS NONTESTIMONIAL (AND THUS NOT REACHED BY THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE), see MD-EV 800:10 and 800:12—800:19, IF IT IS: 
 
 A. U.S. Supreme Court Cases: Nontestimonial Hearsay 
 
  (1)  Business records (generally) (see Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6)); or  
  (2)   “Casual remarks to an acquaintance” or overheard, off-the-cuff remarks; or 
  (3)     Statements by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of a conspiracy 
(see Md. Rule 5-803(a)(5)); or 
  (4)  Statements made “unwittingly” to an informant or undercover officer.  
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).   
N.b.  The Confrontation Clause will not exclude, even if testimonial HS: 
(1)  The accused’s own statement, or another’s adopted by the accused 
(see Md. Rule 5-803(a)(1)-(2)).  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004); Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.); or  
(2)  Dying declarations (see Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2)). Crawford n.6; Hailes v. 
State, 442 Md. 488, 506-14 (2015)  (for reasons of justice, dying declarations 
were an exception to the confrontation right at common law that was not 






  (5)  911 call where a declarant reasonably would conclude that operator, as agent 
of police, “objectively” had “primary purpose” “to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 554 U.S. 353 (2006).   
 
   Declarant-victim’s initial call in Davis was “plainly physical a call for help 
against a bona fide physical threat”; victim’s responses were “frantic.”   
 
  (6)  Dictum in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), p. 21 above: 
Merely routine records kept in the ordinary course of business, such as of 
routine maintenance of equipment. E.g., United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 
F.3d 742 (4th Cir. 2011) (Treasury Enforcement Communications Systems 
records of vehicles crossing into the United States and their license plates were 
nontestimonial).   
 
  (7)  Dictum in Melendez-Diaz: Certificates of authentication of a pre-existing 
official document.   
 
  (8)  Shooting victim’s statements in response to police’s questions, as victim lay 
mortally wounded, outside a gas station, under all the pertinent 
circumstances, showing primary purpose of resolving emergency. Michigan v. 
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (over vehement dissent of Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ.).   
 
   Majority opinion by Justice Sotomayor held that whether statements are 
testimonial is determined by a multi-factor analysis, and the presence or absence 
of one factor is not dispositive.   
 
   The factors include (1) whether there seemed to be an ongoing emergency; (2) 
the degree of formality of the interrogation; and (3) an objective evaluation 
of the questions posed and answers given under all the circumstances in 
which the declarant made the statements at issue.   
 
   As to factor (1), she noted that a deadly weapon had been used; the medical 
condition of the victim (who had asked several times when medical help would 
arrive); the shooter had not been located; and that the “zone of potential victims” 
was broader than in a domestic violence case.   
 
   Seemingly veering away from Crawford’s historical reasoning and back toward 
that of Ohio v. Roberts’ focus on reliability, Justice Sotomayor wrote: “implicit in 
Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for 
the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumed significantly 
diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be 







  (9) Cellmark report on DNA analysis. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (U.S. 
2012) (plurality), p. 23 above.  See MD-EV 800:15.   
 
              (10)   Young child’s statements to his preschool teachers, identifying the defendant 
as the person who had caused his injuries.  Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 
(2015) (Alito, J.)  (“neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of 
assisting in [defendant]'s prosecution”) (Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas, JJ., 
concurred in the judgment).  The teachers needed to ascertain whether it was safe 
to return the child to his home environment, and whether other children might be 
at risk.  The Court noted “strong evidence that statements made in circumstances 
similar to those facing [the child victim] were admissible at common law” and 
thus it is “highly doubtful that statements like [the child’s] ever would have been 
understood to raise Confrontation Clause concerns.”  That the teachers were 
required by Ohio law to report suspected child abuse to government authorities 
did not convert that into the teachers’ primary mission. Moreover, “the fact that 
the witness is unavailable because of a different rule of evidence [incompetency 
due to youth, under Ohio law] does not change our analysis.” 
 
          The conviction was affirmed on remand, 2016 WL 2586638 (Ohio App. 2016) (no 
error in admission of three-year-old’s statements under the Ohio “tender years” 
hearsay exception, which required independent proof of abuse and analysis of 
several factors as to whether the child was particularly likely to be telling the 
truth).  See MD-EV 800:19.    
 
 B.  Maryland Cases:  Nontestimonial Hearsay 
 
  Statements to Police and Their Agents 
 
  (11)  Dying declaration by victim, under facts similar to those in Michigan v. Bryant, 
p. 26 above: a chaotic situation, and shooter’s whereabouts were unknown.  
Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642 (2006).  The Court of Appeals has subsequently 
held that the Confrontation Clause is inapplicable to all dying declarations. Hailes 
v. State, 442 Md. 488 (2015).  See p. 25 above. 
 
  (12)  Domestic violence victim’s excited utterances, imploring defendant to stop, 
heard by 911 operator over cell phone that had been left on during the assault. 
Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95 (2005) (Kenney, J.), cert. denied, 390 Md. 9 
(2005).   
 
  (13)  Domestic violence victim’s sobbing utterances in two 911 calls, requesting 
police and an ambulance and describing defendant and his car (defendant hung 
up phone the first time; the second time victim says he has left but she knows he 






  (14)  911 call reporting license tag numbers and color of car in which shooter had 
just fled after leaving carry-out where shooting occurred; caller noted that she 
was not summoning the police:  they were already on the way.  Langley v. State, 
421 Md. 560 (2011) (4 to 3 decision) (Harrell, J.) (majority relied on Bryant, p. 26 
above; Bell, C.J., and Greene and Eldridge, JJ., dissented).  
 
  (15)  Several excited utterances made by declarant while pacing back and forth, to 
responding police officer’s questions; declarant had himself been stabbed, 
while trying to prevent flight of assailant who had fatally stabbed declarant’s 
friend at a crowded tavern. When officer arrived, both victims were bleeding, and 
assailant’s whereabouts were unknown. Officer called for medical assistance 
twice, and testified it took the police about 30 minutes to secure the tavern and 
make sure the suspect was not still there. Weapon was a knife. Not a domestic 
violence case.   
 
   “Viewed objectively, the total circumstances…make clear that ‘the primary 
purpose’ of the officer’s questioning…was to meet an ongoing emergency.” 
Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245 (2012) (D. Eyler, J.).  
 
  (16)  Certain DNA reports.  Derr II, 434 Md. 88 (2013), p. 24 above. 
 
  Statements to Medical Personnel (see MD-EV 800:14) 
 
  (17)  Statements by injured child to nurse examining him when admitting him to 
pediatric ward, describing who had harmed him, even though child had been 
brought to emergency room by police, who were questioning defendant.  Griner 
v. State, 168 Md. App. 714 (2006) (Salmon, J.).    
 
  Casual Remarks 
 
               (18)  State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 714-18 (2014) (wiretapped conversations between 
defendant and cohorts triggered neither Crawford nor Bruton, but nonetheless, 
severance of retrials should be considered);   
 
   Casual remarks made by one inmate to another, describing the alleged crime. 
Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630 (2011) (Greene, J.) (noting similarity of facts to those 
of Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, (1970)). See Cox, 421 Md. at 650.  Cox: 
 
   “We hold that when the State seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement against 
a criminal defendant, the proper inquiry under Crawford and Bryant [p. 26 above] 
is to determine whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s situation would 
have made the statement ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 







  Parts of Autopsy Reports 
 
  (19)  In its earliest post-Crawford ruling on this subject, the Court of Appeals strained 
to hold,“[R]outine, descriptive and not analytical, [but] objectively 
ascertained and generally reliable facts” in autopsy reports are 
nontestimonial; the recording of them is required by Md. Code Ann., Health Gen. 
§ 5-311. Rollins v. State, 392 Md. 455 (2006).   
 
   The rationale of Rollins was implicitly overruled by Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming.  See Derr I, p. 23 above; Green v. State, 199 Md. App. 386, 403-04 
(2011). See MD-EV 800:15 at notes 127-60 and accompanying text. 
 
   In Malaska v. State, 216 Md. App. 492 (2014) (Kehoe, J.), p. 23 above, the Court 
of Special Appeals, relying on Williams and Derr II, pp. 23-24 above, held that 
the victim’s autopsy report, complying with Maryland statutes and signed by three 
physicians, was testimonial, but that the medical examiner's supervisor’s 
testimony, subject to cross-examination by the defendant, satisfied his 
confrontation right, so that the autopsy report was properly admitted into 
evidence.  The supervisor testified that he was present during the dissection, 
reviewed all the slides, and made the ultimate determination as to the cause and 
manner of death. 
 
  Statements by Coconspirators During and in Furtherance of Conspiracy 
 
  (20) State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680 (2013) (insufficient evidence that Payne had 




Chart 5 DID THE ACCUSED “FORFEIT” HIS OR HER CONFRONTATION RIGHT? 
 
Contrast with this doctrine of “forfeiture by wrongdoing” the  related question of a defendant’s 
waiver of face-to-face confrontation by, e.g., being disruptive in the courtroom, Cousins v. State, 
231 Md. App. 417 (2017) (having discharged counsel though court had found no reason to do so, 
defendant announced intention to disrupt proceedings and embarked on profane rant against 
judge; defendant was ordered from the courtroom and refused numerous opportunities to reenter, 
if he agreed to behave civilly; there was no requirement to contemporaneously record the 
proceedings so that the defendant could see or hear them); Shiflett v. State, 229 Md. App. 645 
(2016) (defendant refused to comply with judge’s order to wear stun cuff, which judge had 
determined was required for courtroom security);  In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451 (2016) (Sharer, 
J.) (same presumption against shackling applies in juvenile proceedings as in adult criminal 
courts; “[W]e hold that juveniles should not be shackled while appearing at juvenile court 
hearings, unless and until there has been a finding on the record that the juvenile poses a security 
concern or threat that would disrupt those particular proceedings or involve danger to the 
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Authority:  Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). N.b. not only dicta in majority opinion 
(Scalia, J.) but also the partial concurrence (Souter and Ginsburg, JJ.) and the dissent (Breyer, 
Stevens, and Kennedy, JJ.) leave the door open for finding such intent upon proof of an intent to 
“isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities.”  See MD-EV 800:9.   
 




Did “wrongdoing” cause that unavailability? 
 
Did the Accused commit (participate in, authorize or 
conspire to do) the wrongdoing? 
 
Did the Accused do that with the intention to prevent 
the Declarant from testifying? 
 
No: no forfeiture. 
Yes 
No: no forfeiture. 
No: no forfeiture. 
Yes 
Yes 
No: no forfeiture. 
Yes 
The Defendant has lost the right to confront the 
Declarant and cannot complain about the admission 






Chart 6 HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS  
 
 A. Multiple Hearsay: OCS’S Within OCS’s :  Md. Rule 5-805 
 
  When offered evidence contains OCS’s by more than one declarant, each OCS must be 
evaluated independently. 
 
  Moreover, if there is more than one “level” of evidence, i.e., we are asked to rely on 
one OCS to prove another OCS made earlier (as is often the case with medical records 
or social workers’ reports), then we can’t get to the earlier OCS unless the more recent 
one is admissible (either as nonhearsay or hearsay falling within a hearsay exception). 
See Handy v. State, p. 17 above; Cooley v. State, 157 Md. App. 101 (2004) (one level 
of OCS was nonhearsay and the other was hearsay falling within an exception), rev’d 
on other grounds, 385 Md. 165 (2005); State v. Jones, 138 Md. App. 178 (2001) 
(Hollander, J.). See MD-EV 805:1-805:2. 
 
 B.  Hearsay Exceptions that Are Applicable Only if the Declarant Testifies at Trial and is 
Subject to Cross-Examination: Md. Rule 5-802.1 
 
  N.b:  The hearsay may be proved by the testimony either of the declarant or of someone 
other than the declarant, as long as the prerequisites of the Rule are met. 
 
  1.  Md. Rule 5-802.1(a): A subcategory of a testifying witness’s prior 
inconsistent statements (“Nance statements”).  See MD-EV 801(2):1. 
 
   The required foundation: 
 
   a. The witness-declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement; and 
 
   b.   If this requirement is met, then Md. Rule 5-802.1(a) permits substantive use 
of a witness’s prior inconsistent statements if they are either: 
 
    (1) written and signed; or 
    (2)  stenographically or electronically recorded; or 
    (3)  made under oath at deposition, trial, or in a hearing or another 
proceeding, including a grand jury proceeding. 
 
    E.g., Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.) 
(recanting witness’s prior inconsistent, audio-recorded statement to police 
was properly admitted), cert. denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011). 
 
  2. Md. Rule 5-802.1(b):  A Subcategory of a Testifying Witness’s Prior 






   The required foundation: 
 
   a. The witness-declarant must testify at trial and be “subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement”; 
 
   b. The prior statement by the witness-declarant must be consistent with his or 
her testimony at trial; 
 
   c. The prior statement must be “offered to rebut an expressed or implied 
charge against the declarant of fabrication, or improper influence or 
motive;” and 
 
   d.   The prior statement must precede the alleged improper influence or motive 
in order to be admissible as substantive evidence under Md. Rule 5-
802.1(b). Holmes v. State, 350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998) (Chasanow, 
J.); Thomas v. State, 202 Md. App. 386 (2011) (Raker, J.) (motive to lie 
arose as soon as witness knew he was under investigation and/or stopped by 
police). 
 
     But Acker v. State, 219 Md. App. 210 (2014) (Kehoe, J.), cert. denied, 441 
Md. 62 (2014), importantly held that “factually unsupported and conclusory 
allegations of bias or fabrication,”  including broad-brush “bald assertions 
such as that the victim of alleged child sexual abuse was ‘starved for 
attention’ and therefore is inherently unworthy of belief,” as well as an 
allegation, unsupported by evidence, that the child was motivated to lie 
because the defendant had rebuffed an advance by the child’s mother, do 
not suffice to act as a bar to the admission of the  declarant’s prior 
consistent statements as substantive evidence, when those statements 
predated  a temporally-specific allegation of bias, regarding the defendant's 
filing of a lawsuit against a family friend.  (The court distinguished 
Hajireen v. State, 203 Md. App. 537 (2012), cert. denied, 429 Md. 306 
(2012), where only one theory of bias had been argued.) 
 
  3.    Md. Rule 5-802.1(c):   The Witness’s Prior Identification of a Person (at a 
Line-Up, etc.)  See MD-EV 801(3):1—801(3):2. 
 
   E.g., Marlin v. State, 192 Md. App. 134, 144-47 (2010) (Hollander, J.) (finding 
evidence of identification at photo array by recanting witness admissible), cert. 
denied, 415 Md. 339 (2011). 
 
   N.b.: Due process issue arises only if state action has made the circumstances of 
the identification unduly suggestive. In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451 (2016) (no 
error in master’s denial of defense motion to suppress identification, as “there 
were sufficient indicia of reliability overall to support the court’s decision to 





rendered it impermissibly suggestive”); Wood v. State, 196 Md. App. 146, 151-63 
(2010) (Moylan, J.), cert denied, 418 Md. 192 (2011). Accord Perry v. New 
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (U.S. 2012). 
 
  4.    Md. Rule 5-802.1(d):  Prompt Report of Sexual Assault, Consistent with 
Declarant’s Trial Testimony. See MD-EV 801(2):2. 
 
   Required foundation: 
 
   a. Witness-declarant must testify at trial and be “subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement”; 
 
   b.    Prior statement must be consistent with the witness’s testimony at trial; 
 
   c.   Prior statement must have been a victim’s “prompt complaint of sexually 
assaultive behavior.” See  Choate v. State, 214 Md. App. 118, 143-49 
(2013) (Moylan, J.), cert. denied, 436 Md. 328 (2013)  victim's sister's 
testimony  to victim's prompt phone call to her, reporting rape,  and 
contextual statements, were properly admitted as substantive evidence;  
there is no requirement that the defense have made an issue about the 
promptness of any report); 
 
            Nelson v. State, 137 Md. App. 402 (2001) (Moylan, J.) (13-year old girl’s 
statement to her 11-year-old sister, made shortly after defendant left their 
apartment, that defendant had raped her, qualified for admission under Md. 
Rule 5-802.1(d); victim’s statements a day later to her school counselor and 
to a nurse-sexual assault examiner would likely also have qualified, but no 
objections to them were preserved). 
 
   d.    These are admissible in both civil and criminal cases.  
 
     The Court of Appeals declined to address how much detail may be admitted 
under this exception, and when, in Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 209, 236-37 
(2013). 
 
  5.    Md. Rule 802.1(e): Recorded Recollection. See MD-EV 803(5):1—803(5):2. 
 
  6. Child Abuse Cases 
 
   a. “Tender years” exception, Md. Code Ann., Crim. Pro. § 11-304. See MD-
EV 803(27):1. 
 
    In a criminal proceeding or in a juvenile proceeding other than a CINA 
proceeding, when this hearsay exception is relied upon, the child victim 






     Compare Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015), p. 27 above (no violation 
of confrontation clause to admit, under Ohio’s “tender years” hearsay 
exception, nontestimonial statements of three-year old child abuse victim to 
his preschool teachers as to who caused his injuries, when child was 
incompetent to testify under Ohio law). 
 
    See In re J.J., 231 Md. App. 304 (2016) (Graeff, J.) (no clear error in 
juvenile court’s factual findings, nor error on law in ruling, after  hearing 
social worker testify to nine-year old child’s statements to her, in E.R. 
treatment room, regarding sexual abuse by father, and listening to the audio-
recorded interview, and considering – on the record – all thirteen 11-304 
factors, that child’s statements in question were reliable and admissible; due 
to availability of recording, no requirement to have child testify as to 
admissibility under this statute; child’s competency as a witness was not 
relevant to 11-304 determination, nor were DNA results, nor questions that 
went merely to impeachment of child's credibility, rather than to 11-304 
factors). 
 
    Evidence included (1) that J.J. said her father had rubbed his “wee-wee” on 
her “private part” and had made her “suck his wee-wee”; (2) that J.J. 
indicated with her hands the length and width of the penis; (3) had then 
drawn a picture of it; and, (4) in answer to a question as to “what happens 
when you have to suck someone’s wee-wee,” performed an act with a pen. 
    Under these facts, were all of these “statements” by the child? Were they all 
offered for TOMA?      
 
    2017 General Assembly:  House Bill 483, which passed the House and was 
heard in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee on March 28, 2017, 
would have amended 11-304 by adding to subsection (c) an alternative to 
admissibility for a statement other than one made to a person in one of the 
listed professions or occupations.  The amendment reads: 
 
      or (2) The statement: (i) describes the charged offense; (ii) was made 
to the first adult other than the defendant to whom the child victim made a 
statement about the offense; (iii) was promptly reported in accordance with 
section 5-704 or section 5-705 of the Family Law Article; and (iv) was 
documented in writing or by audio or video recording. 
 
    If this bill had passed, it will provide a route of admissibility for important 
evidence that need not comply with Md. Rule 5-802.1(d). 
 







   c.       Recent related case law: Bey v. State, (Md., Mar. 27, 2017) (in a 
prosecution under Md. Code Ann., Crim. L. 3-315, continuing course of 
conduct against a child, multiple convictions and sentences per victim are 
precluded). 
 
 C. Md. Rule 5-803: Hearsay Exceptions Applicable No Matter Whether the Declarant 
is Available or Unavailable to Testify at Trial, and No Matter Whether the 
Declarant Testifies or Not 
 
  These OCS’s may be proved by the declarant’s own testimony to his or her OCS or by 
the testimony of any other witness having first-hand knowledge of the OCS. See MD-
EV 803:1. 
 
 1. Md. Rule 5-803(a), Statement by Party-Opponent: An opposing party’s own, 
adopted, authorized, or agent’s statement, or an opposing party’s coconspirator’s 
statement (often misleadingly referred to as an “admission of a party-opponent.”  
See MD-EV 803(a):1 and 801(4):1—801(4):12. 
 
   a. Any such statement offered by one party, against the opposing party 
who made, adopted, etc. the statement will not be excluded by the 
hearsay rule. See MD-EV 801(4):1. 
     
    If it is to be excluded, it will be due to some other rule.  See, e.g., Smith v. 
Delaware North Companies, 446 Md. 290 (2016) (Greene, J.) (reversible 
error to admit, as evidence against the plaintiff-physician – here, by 
impeaching her expert – a consent order entered into between the physician 
and the Board of Physicians; admissibility is prohibited by Md. Code Ann., 
Health Occ. § 14-410, which applies to any type of action);  Butler v. State, 
231 Md. App. 533 (2017) (reversible error to admit defendant's statements 
made during first proffer session, in which he had lied, when detectives told 
him he had “started fresh” in second session). 
 
   b.    The phrase “admission against interest,” found in some case law, is a 
misleading, mythological creature.  Unlike under Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3) 
(“declaration against interest” by a now unavailable declarant), under Md.  
Rule 5-803(a) there is no requirement that the OCS of a party opponent 
have been disserving to the declarant at the time it was made. 
 
   c. Md. Rule 5-803(a)(1): Statement of party opponent by that party himself 
or herself (See MD-EV 801(4):2 and 801(4):8) 
 
     See Oku v. State, 433 Md. 582 (2013) (Barbera, C.J.) (defendant’s 







    Flight Evidence: See State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 56-59 (2011) (Adkins, J.) 
(error to have given “flight” instruction to jury when evidence showed only 
that defendant left scene of crime and took various steps to avoid being 
apprehended: these steps did not amount to “flight”). 
 
    Song Lyrics/Fiction:  Hannah v. State, 420 Md. 339 (2011) (Murphy, J.)  
held that the trial court had committed reversible error in permitting the 
prosecutor to admit on cross-examination, after the alleged shooter-
defendant had testified that he had no access to handguns and had never 
held one, the defendant’s drawing of a gun and ten rap lyrics he had written 
about guns and shootings. 
 
    The appellate court distinguished inadmissible works of fiction from 
possibly admissible autobiographical statements of historical fact.  It 
found that the evidence in this case lacked the special relevance needed to 
make it admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b), and amounted to mere 
propensity evidence as to violence. The door had not been opened by 
defendant’s direct examination. 
 
   d. Md. Rule 5-803(a)(2):  Adoptive Statements (See MD-EV 801(4):3 and 
801(4):(9)) 
 
    (i)  Defendant adopted alleged coconspirator’s statements to a fellow 
inmate by standing by and adding details. Cox v. State, 194 Md. 
App. 629 (2010) (Graeff, J.) (affirming J. Watts), aff’d, 421 Md. 630 
(2011) (Greene, J.) (Court of Appeals did not reach this issue: see 421 
Md. at 641 n.4). 
 
    (ii)  State’s plea agreement with a witness that the witness would testify 
truthfully did not make that witness’s actual testimony at the trial of a 
likely codefendant admissible as an adoptive admission by the State in 
the subsequent trial of the defendant.  Defense was permitted to call 
witness, but not to prove plea agreement.  Armstead v. State, 195 Md. 
App. 599 (2010) (Kenney, J.), cert. denied, 418 Md. 191 (2011). 
 
    (iii) Tacit Admissions:  A person’s silence in the face of another’s 
statement can be interpreted as acquiescence in the truth of (adoption 
by silence of) the other’s statement when three conditions are met: 
 
     (1)  The party-opponent (or party’s agent, etc.) heard the other’s 
statement; 
 
     (2)  The circumstances allowed for the party-opponent (or agent, etc.) 






     (3)  Under the circumstances, ordinarily a person similarly situated 
who was in disagreement would “speak up” and correct the 
speaker. 
 
     These preliminary facts regarding tacit admissions (and other adoptive 
admissions also addressed by Md. Rule 5-803(a)(2)) fall under Md. 
Rule 5-104(b).  If a reasonable jury could find them to be met, the 
judge should admit the evidence (subject to Md. Rule 5-403). 
 
   e. Statements Authorized by a Party-Opponent (see MD-EV 801(4):4 and 
801(4):10) 
 
   f. Statements by a Party-Opponent’s Coconspirator During and in 
Furtherance of the Conspiracy (see MD-EV 801(5):1—801(5):2) 
 
    See, e.g., State v. Payne, 440 Md. 680 (2014); Ross v. State (Md. App. Mar. 
3, 2017) (J. Moylan) (text message from one coconspirator to another, that 
defendant was “moving too fast,” put defendant in conspiracy; in any event, 
evidence was admitted without objection). 
 
  2. Md. Rule 5-803(b): Other Exceptions that Apply Whether or Not the 
Declarant Testifies at Trial or is Available or Unavailable to Testify 
 
   a.   Md. Rule 5-803(b)(1), Present sense impressions: a very small window of 
time. See MD-EV 803(1):1—803(1):2. 
 
    Foundation elements: 
 
    (i) The OCS was made while the declarant was perceiving the event, or 
immediately afterwards; and 
 
    (ii) The OCS merely describes or explains the event. 
 
   b.   Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2), Excited utterances:  a bigger window, as long as 
the declarant was still so upset by the event that s/he was not thinking 
before speaking, so as to be able to fabricate a self-serving statement.  
See MD-EV 803(2):1—803(2):2. 
 
    Foundation elements: 
 
    (i) a startling event occurred; 
 
    (ii) OCS was made while the declarant remained under such stress 
that s/he could not stop to think (and thus to fabricate a self-





declarant’s emotional state, the time lapse between the startling event 
and the OCS, and whether leading questions were asked); and 
 
    (iii) The OCS relates to the starting event. 
 
    Witness, such as the declarant herself or another who heard the OCS, such 
as a police officer, must lay foundation: describe affect of declarant; time 
lapse; questions asked, if any; other evidence of startling event, injuries, etc.  
See Cooper v. State, 434 Md. 237-45 (2013) (rape victim's statements to 
roommate and police detective were properly admitted). 
 
   c. Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3), Statements by declarant as to his or her present 
state of mind or physical condition: nonhearsay if not offered for TOMA, 
but admissible hearsay under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3) if offered for TOMA of 
the declarant’s asserted state of mind, rather than to prove the truth of a fact 
that had led to the declarant’s state of mind. Shepard v. United States, 290 
U.S. 96 (1933). See MD-EV 803(3):2 and 803(3):4 (physical condition); 











    Declarant’s OCS as to his/her state of mind existing at time of OCS is: 
 
    (i) Admissible to show declarant’s state of mind, when relevant. See 
Edery v. Edery, 193 Md. App. 215 (2010) (Meredith, J.) (decedent’s 
statements that she wanted to be buried in Israel were improperly 
excluded when offered to show her wishes). 
 
     Ex.  Victim’s statements of her fear of the defendant, made before her 
murder, and a domestic violence protective order that prohibited the 
defendant from entering the victim’s home, were admissible as 
relevant to defense raised that victim had invited defendant into her 
home, and gun went off accidentally. Case v. State, 188 Md. App. 279 
(1997) (Murphy, J.). 
 
    (ii) Admissible to show declarant’s subsequent action, after the 
statement, in accordance with stated intent. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892). 
Rule 5-803(b)(3)  Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition 
A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or 
physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), offered to prove the declarant’s then existing condition or the declarant’s future 
action, but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered 







     Ex.  “I’m going to skip school tomorrow,” admissible to show 
declarant played hooky the next day. 
 
     See Figgins v. Cochrane, 174 Md. App. 1, 27-31 (2007) (Moylan, J.) 
(Hillmon analysis inapplicable when no contention that declarant 
subsequently acted in accord with stated intent), aff’d, 430 Md. 392 
(2008). 
 
     In Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573 (2011) (Rodowsky, J.) where the 
critical issue was whether the defendant had shot the victim or the 
victim had committed suicide, it was reversible error to admit  State’s 
evidence tending to show that the victim was not depressed, but to 
exclude testimony of a trooper – who had arrested the victim for DWI 
one month before the victim’s death – that the victim appeared to be 
depressed, stressed about the situation, and that the victim said to 
trooper, “This is the last thing I need in my life right now on top of all 
the…other shit going on in my life.” 
 
     The Court of Appeals did not analyze whether the OCS was offered 
for TOMA.  The OCS could have been relevant just to show that was 
how the victim felt, not that a lot really was going on in the victim’s 
life, in which case it would have been admissible as nonhearsay; but in 
either case it was admissible. 
 
    (iii)  But inadmissible (under this hearsay exception only) to show 
something that occurred prior to the statement, that caused declarant 
to have the particular state of mind. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 
96 (1933). 
 
     Ex. “I hate Phil because he hits me and breaks my toys.” Admissible to 
show that declarant hates/dislikes Phil, if that is relevant to the case; 
inadmissible, if offered under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(3), to show that Phil 
has hit the declarant. 
 
   d. Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4), Statement of past or present facts, made while 
seeking medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of 
















    Required foundation: 
 
    (i) OCS made by person seeking medical treatment, should medical 
treatment become necessary; and 
 
    (ii)  Declarant knew that OCS would be relied on for possible treatment. 
(This is the circumstantial guarantee of sincerity.) 
 
     If a patient is a child, it is particularly important that the doctor or 
nurse explains to the patient (or other declarant, e.g., parent) that 
what is said by the declarant will determine treatment. See State v. 
Coates, 405 Md. 131 (2008) (Greene, J.) (reversible error to admit 
evidence); Low v. State, 119 Md. 413 (1998) (Thieme and Byrnes, JJ.). 
 
    (iii)  Only the facts related in the OCS that are reasonably pertinent to 
medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment will be 
properly admissible. 
 
     Query:  Can the identification of the person who causes injuries ever 
be pertinent to medical treatment and thus admissible under Md. Rule 
5-803(b)(4)? 
 
     Yes, e.g., to identify poison given, and thus the proper antidote. If 
child abuse, “not ordinarily.” State v. Coates, 405 Md. 131 (2008) 
(Greene, J.), aff’g 175 Md. App. 588 (2002) (Hollander, J.) (it was 
known at time of OCS that child no longer had any contact with its 
perpetrator).  But see In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 33-36 (1988) 
(R. Bell, J.) (yes, due to possible testing for sexually transmitted 
disease; possible removal from home). 
 
     A number of federal cases hold that relevance to psychological 
treatment, because of abuse, is sufficient. 
 
   e.   Md. Rule 5-803(b)(6), Business records (see MD-EV 803(6):1—803(6):2) 
 
Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or 
Treatment 
  
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in 
contemplation of treatment and describing medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain, or sensation, or the inception or general character of the cause or 
external sources thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in 







   f.  Absence of entries in business records (see MD-EV 803(7):1—803(7):2) 
 
   g.  Public (governmental agent is the declarant) records and reports (see 
MD-EV 803(8):1—803(8):2)  
 
    Note that a new subsection, Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8)(A)(iv,) was added by 
Rules Order of September 17, 2015, creating a hearsay exception, in a final 
protective order hearing, for factual findings made by the Department 
of Social Services, regarding abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, 
reported to the court pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 4-505.  A 
Committee note adds that a continuance may be granted if necessary to 
provide the parties a fair opportunity to review the report and prepare for 
the hearing, including an opportunity to subpoena the author.  The amended 
Rule applies to all actions commenced on or after January 1, 2016 and, 
insofar as practicable, to all actions then pending. 
 
    Because of body cameras now used by police, an amendment was needed 
to Md. Rule 5-803(b)(8), as subsection (C) generally precludes the 
admission against an accused of records of matters observed by law 
enforcement. New subsection (D) provides for the admissibility of such 
camera recordings (subject to Md. Rule 5-805, re: multiple hearsay), if 
properly authenticated, made contemporaneously with the matter recorded, 
and circumstances do not indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
 
   h.   Records of vital statistics (birth, death) (see MD-EV 803(9):1—803(9):2) 
 
   i.   Absence of public record or entry (see MD-EV 803(10):1—803(10):2) 
 
   j.  Records of churches and other religious organizations (see MD-EV 
803(11):1—803(11):2) 
 
   k.  Certificates of marriage, baptism, etc. (see MD-EV 803(12):1—
803(12):2) 
 
   l.  Family records (see MD-EV 803(13):1—803(13):2) 
 
   m.  Records of documents (rather than the documents themselves) affecting an 
interest in property (see MD-EV 803(14):1—803(14):2) 
 
   n.  Statements in documents affecting an interest in property (see MD-EV 
803(15):1—803(15):2) 
 
   o.  Ancient documents (more than 30 years old; new controversy in the works, 






   p.  Market reports and commercial publications (see MD-EV 803(17):1—
803(17):2) 
 
   q.   Learned treatises (nascent case law with regard to Internet sources) (see 
MD-EV 803(18):1—803(18):2) 
 
   r.  Reputation concerning personal or family history (see MD-EV 
803(19):1—803(19):2) 
 
   s.  Reputation concerning boundaries or general history (see MD-EV 
803(20):1—803(20):2) 
 
   t.   Reputation as to character (see MD-EV 803(21):1—803(21):2) 
 
   u.  Judgment of previous conviction: see Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-
912 (see MD-EV 803(22):1) 
 
   v.   Judgment as to personal or family history, general history, or 
boundaries (see MD-EV 803(23):1—803(23):2) 
 
   w. Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24), the “catch-all” exception (see MD-EV 803(24):1–
803(24):2 and 807:1—807:2) 
 
    Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245 (2012) (D. Eyler, J.) (trial court properly 
excluded unavailable declarant’s OCS, in which declarant recanted prior 
statements identifying defendant to police, when offered by defense for 
TOMA; finding also that defense barely preserved the issue of whether the 
OCS was admissible to impeach the declarant under Md.  Rule 5-806, the 
court held that exclusion of the OCS was harmless error, in light of the 
other evidence in the case, where the OCS offered by State did not directly 
identify defendant). 
 
 D. Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Only When the Declarant is Shown, under Md. Rule 
5-804(a), to be Unavailable to Testify (see MD-EV 804:1—804:2) 
 
  As to one of the possible bases for unavailability, the declarant's “then existing physical 
or mental illness or infirmity,” under Md. Rule 5-804(a)(4), see Vielot v. State, 225 Md. 
App. 492, 498-504 (2015) (Reed, J.), cert. denied, 446 Md. 706 (2016) (no abuse of 
discretion in finding that witness was unavailable to attend retrial when she had had 
shoulder surgery that required extensive physical therapy and could not drive from New 
Jersey to Maryland – State had offered witness’s disability certificate and a doctor's 
note – and thus no error in admitting declarant's prior testimony, which otherwise 






  1. Md. Rule 5-804(b)(1), Prior testimony now offered against a party who had an 
opportunity and similar motive to examine the declarant at the earlier 
proceeding.  See MD-EV 804(1):1—804(1):2. 
 
   In Williams v. State, 416 Md. 670 (2010) (Raker, J.), the State had violated its 
discovery obligation under Md. Rule 4-263(d), when it had not disclosed 
impeaching information known to a police officer that had come to light after the 
first trial: that a key eyewitness had said she was “legally blind.”  The eyewitness 
died before the retrial. 
 
   The second trial judge admitted the witness’s videotaped testimony, along with 
medical records about her vision and the detective’s testimony that she had told 
him she was legally blind. The Court of Appeals’ majority found these steps an 
inadequate substitute for the ability to cross-examine the eyewitness.  It concluded 
that:  “On remand, if the State wishes to introduce portions of the previously 
recorded testimony, the trial court should redact any portion which relates to what 
she might have seen or testimony depending upon her vision.”  Judge Murphy, 
joined by Judge Rodowsky, dissented. 
 
  2.    Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2), Dying declarations. See MD-EV 804(2):1—804(2):2. 
 
   Hailes v. State, 442 Md. 488, 505-06 (2015) (statement made 2 years before death 
qualified; “[W]e hold that the length of time between a statement and the 
declarant's death is entitled to little, if any, weight in determining whether a 
declarant believed that the declarant's death was imminent when the declarant 
made the statement.”); Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 642 (2006).   
 
  3. Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3), Statements against the unavailable declarant’s 
pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interest.  See MD-EV 804(3):1—804(3):2. 
 
  4. Md. Rule 5-804(b)(4), Statements of personal or family history, such as 
lineage.  See MD-EV 804(4):1—804(4):2. 
 
  5.   The “forfeiture by wrongdoing” hearsay exceptions: Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) 
(civil); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-901 (certain criminal cases 
only).  See MD-EV 804(5):1. 
 
   Both rules restrict the types of statements potentially admissible to only 
recorded or written and signed statements (the same types that are also 
potentially substantively admissible prior inconsistent statements under Md. Rule 
5-802.1(a), a rule that applies when the declarant testifies at trial).  They also 







   The criminal statute foregoes the usual preliminary fact standards of Md. Rule 5-
104(a) and imposes higher burdens:  (1) proof “by clear and convincing evidence 
that the party against whom the statement is offered engaged in, directed, or 
conspired to commit the wrongdoing that procured the unavailability of the 
declarant”; and (2) that the rules of evidence are “strictly applied” by the court in 
making this determination. 
 
   The criminal statute applies only in trials for certain crimes (generally, crimes of 
violence and drug crimes).  
 
   As to the concomitant forfeiture of the confrontation right, see Chart 5, pp. 29-30 
above. 
